The opening of an investigation by the United States against the Brazilian instant payment system, PIX, has highlighted the strategic use of law as an instrument of economic warfare. On July 15, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) launched a proceeding under Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act, following complaints from the Information Technology Industry Council (ITI), a U.S. trade association that includes giants such as Apple, Google, Mastercard, Visa, PayPal, and Meta. The target is the model adopted by the Central Bank of Brazil, accused of distorting competition by acting simultaneously as regulator and operator of the system.
According to ITI, foreign companies are harmed by rules that favor PIX: banks are required to feature it prominently in their apps, international players are allegedly excluded from the ecosystem, and there are tax advantages compared to solutions such as Apple Pay, Visa, or Mastercard. The Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded to the criticisms with a letter delivered to the U.S. ambassador on August 18, defending PIX as a public policy for financial inclusion that expanded the population’s access to digital payment methods while reinforcing national monetary sovereignty.
The legal mechanism underpinning the investigation dates back to the protectionist context of the post–1974 oil shock. Section 301 grants the USTR powers to investigate foreign practices considered unjustifiable or restrictive of U.S. trade. If violations are confirmed, the U.S. government shall take measures (“mandatory”), which may include bilateral negotiations or WTO proceedings. At present, besides Brazil, proceedings are also under way against China and Nicaragua.
Although in previous administrations Section 301 was often used as a basis for multilateral litigation, the current context points to direct negotiations with greater political and economic pressure. It is in this context that the Magnitsky Act emerges as a reinforcement to the U.S. arsenal. Only two weeks after the opening of the PIX investigation, the Trump administration imposed sanctions against Alexandre de Moraes, Juge of the Brazilian Supreme Federal Court, based on this law.
Enacted in 2012 and expanded in 2016, the Magnitsky Act allows the U.S. to sanction, anywhere in the world, individuals accused of massive corruption or serious human rights violations. The measures include freezing assets in U.S. territory and banning entry into the country. Since then, it has been applied against Russian, Saudi, Chinese, Latin American, and African authorities. The inclusion of Moraes, however, sparked controversy: NGOs such as Transparency International and Human Rights First pointed out the risk of political use of the legislation, which could compromise its credibility.
Although presented as a response to human rights concerns, the measure carries weight on the economic chessboard. Once listed by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), any dollar-denominated transaction involving Moraes must be blocked, even by banks without a U.S. presence. Brazilian financial institutions, fearing reprisals, tend to comply with U.S. injunctions. The blocking of a U.S.-branded credit card issued by Banco do Brasil in the minister’s name illustrates the reach of the sanctions.
The use of the Magnitsky Act at this juncture suggests a direct link with the pressure over PIX. The intertwining of legal instruments and economic interests is not new. Laws such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (1977), the Helms-Burton Act (on Cuba), and the D’Amato-Kennedy Act (on Iran and Libya) have long been used in international disputes. Billion-dollar fines against European companies such as Siemens, Alstom, BNP Paribas, and HSBC consolidated the perception that such statutes function as weapons of U.S. industrial policy.
High-profile cases reinforce this view. Executives from the French company Alstom were arrested on U.S. soil during corruption investigations while General Electric was negotiating the purchase of its energy division. FCPA violations resulted in multibillion-dollar fines for European banks, while U.S. institutions were comparatively less penalized.
In this scenario, the offensive against PIX seems to fit into a similar strategy. By challenging the Brazilian model and deploying instruments such as the Magnitsky Act, the United States increases its bargaining power in negotiations. For Brazil, the dispute is about more than defending a payment system: it concerns preserving regulatory autonomy and the ability to design public policies aimed at financial inclusion.
Talks between the USTR and Brazilian authorities are only beginning, but signs already suggest that the U.S. is mobilizing a robust legal and political arsenal. The question is whether PIX, conceived as a symbol of innovation and inclusion, will withstand the pressure of a dispute that goes beyond payment systems and fits into the broader logic of global economic warfare in which, once again, dominance lies with those who control the dollar.